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disclosure by legal professional privilege? (with an appendix 
giving brief relevant biographical details of the British authors 
of works cited) 
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Abstract: This article examines the process whereby two mid-nineteenth legal cases 
are still cited by some contemporary authorities, particularly Halsbury, for the 
proposition that lawyers’ bills for professional services as a class of documents are 
protected from disclosure by legal professional privilege. It examines these two cases 
in the context of what can be discovered from other sources about the persons 
involved to test to what extent the reliance on them for this purpose remains, or ever 
was, justified. The article then presents a meta-analysis of all discovered texts on 
evidence and discovery published between the date of the first of the two cases and 
the date of their enshrinement with their current status in the first edition of Halsbury 
(and essentially repeated in all later editions to the current one). It shows how limited 
was the use of these two cases in the books on evidence and discovery published 
during the period of analysis. The article concludes with some critical observations on 
what the analysis shows about legal methodology. 
 
Keywords: lawyers’ bills of costs, legal professional privilege; evidence; discovery; 
Halsbury’s Laws of England 
                                                 
1 The phrase comes from Chant v Brown [1852] 9 Hare 790, 790 and 794. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The status of legal textbooks to practitioner lawyers is ambiguous.2 There is some 
tendency to treat them with scepticism as a class of document, and yet in many case 
reports one sees not infrequent reference to the classic examples. Perhaps the best-
known of these is Halsbury’s Laws of England; an electronic search using ‘Halsbury’ 
of an online database of cases reveals literally thousands of reports from recent years, 
in all manner of jurisdictions, containing a Note along the lines of ‘For . . . , see . . . 
Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn) (2004 reissue) . . .’ or, during the most recent couple of 
years, ‘For . . . , see . . . Halsbury’s Laws (5th edn) (2009) . . .’. This article analyses 
at length the authority given in all editions of Halsbury for the principle of English 
law, though now subject to revision, that a bill presented by a lawyer, usually by a 
solicitor to a client, attracts – albeit with some very qualified exceptions – legal 
professional privilege from disclosure. This protection covers the bill as a class of 
document, as distinct from the content of the legal advice that is being billed for. The 
question arose in a case decided in 2007 by the Information Tribunal that overruled 
the Information Commissioner’s defence of the ‘conservative’ view on the privileged 
status of lawyer’s bills based upon the relevant section of Halsbury and, in particular, 
upon the two nineteenth-century cases that are there held to support it.3 
 
 
2. Halsbury’s View Concerning Lawyers’ Bills of Costs 
 
The first edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England began appearing in 1907,4 the second 
edition from 1931,5 and the third from 1952.6 The fourth edition was produced from 
1973,7 later reissued over several years from 1988. In volume 37 (on Civil 
                                                 
2 Ian McLeod, Legal Method (8th edn Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011) 96–100. 
3 See Dr Christopher T Husbands v Information Commissioner, Information Tribunal EA/2006/0048 
(16 February 2007). 
4 The Right Honourable The Earl of Halsbury and others, The Laws of England Being a Complete 
Statement of the Whole Law of England (Butterworth & Co, London 1907-1917). 
5 Viscount Hailsham (ed), The Laws of England, Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law of 
England (2nd edn Butterworth & Co, London 1931-1942). 
6 Lord Simonds (ed), The Laws of England Being a Complete Statement of the Whole Law of England 
(3rd edn Butterworth & Co, London 1952-1964). 
7 Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone (ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn Butterworth & Co, 
London 1973-1987).  
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Procedure), paragraph 573 (p 193), of this fourth-edition reissue of 20018 – in a 
section of the work prepared by Harman John Leslie – it states that ‘bills of costs 
rendered by a solicitor, relating to litigation, actual or in contemplation, are . . . 
privileged’. The fifth edition of Halsbury9 has been produced from 2008 and in 
volume 11 (on Practice and Procedure), paragraph 561 (p 449), appearing in 2009, the 
same passage is reproduced without any amendment, despite some new issues on this 
topic, especially since the passage fully into law in 2005 of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000. Unlike as in the fourth edition, precise responsibility for the 
various parts of the work cannot be assigned; it is said only that there is a consultant 
editor with two named editors and two named sub-editors. A review below of the 
historical case law will reveal the significance of the comprehensiveness of ‘actual or 
in contemplation’. Halsbury goes on to note three exceptions: privilege covers bills 
only ‘so far as they do not extend to (1) what took place in the presence of the 
opposite party; (2) communications with the opposite party; or (3) matters of fact 
which are in the public domain’. 
 Specifically cited in support of the general position are two nineteenth-century 
legal cases, one of which is more than 150 years old and the other more than 130 
years old. These are Chant v Brown10 and Turton v Barber,11 referred to respectively 
hereinafter as Chant and Turton. Both these cases were heard in the Vice-
Chancellors’ Courts – within the Court of Chancery, Charles Dickens’ bête noire at 
the time. Chant was heard in front of Sir George James Turner, who was a Vice-
Chancellor from 1851 to 1853 and who was considered ‘courageous in expanding its 
[the court’s] remedial powers to meet modern developments’.12 Turton was heard in 
                                                 
8 Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone/Lord MacKay of Clashfern (ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th 
edn reissue, Butterworths, London 1988-2008). 
9 Lord MacKay of Clashfern (ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn LexisNexis, London from 
2008). 
10 [1852] 9 Hare 790. There is also an earlier case report involving the same protagonists; see Chant v 
Brown [1849] 7 Hare 79, which was heard also in the Vice-Chancellors’ Courts before Sir James 
Wigram, a Vice-Chancellor from 1841 to 1850. It is explained infra how the two separate cases arose. 
Because the later case is that of principal concern to this article, it will be referred to abbreviated 
simply as Chant. When it is necessary to refer to the former case, it will be called Chant(I). Chant(I) is 
no longer cited in contemporary works on evidence, doubtless because at least one particularly 
generous extension of legal professional privilege that it supported would now be considered a breach 
of professional ethics. 
11 [1874], LR 17 Eq 329. 
12See Steve Hedley, ‘Turner, Sir George James (1798–1867)’ in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, at www.oxforddnb.com. 
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front of Sir Charles Hall, who was a Vice-Chancellor from 1873 to 1882.13 As a 
negative comment on the integrity of this case as a long-standing precedent is the 
implication of a recent comment about Sir Charles. Though the subject of a couple of 
compliments, the view is also expressed about him that ‘he had a thorough and 
detailed knowledge of case law, though this tended to obscure his view of principle’ 
and ‘nor did he display a ready mastery of complex questions of fact’.14 
Halsbury does note two other old cases that, for their particular reasons, had 
been exceptions to this general principle on privilege; these are of interest for their 
recognition in their specific circumstances of the possibility of redaction. In Burton v 
Dodd,15 the well-regarded Sir James Stirling16 ruled that, in general, a bill of costs 
would be privileged but that, in this case, those entries on the bills of costs that were 
relevant to the case should be disclosed; the point arose because a defendant was 
alleging that a compromise agreement should not be enforced against her because she 
had had no independent legal advice. The applicant had disputed this, seeking 
disclosure of the relevant bills to establish the point. In Daily Express (1908) Ltd v 
Mountain,17 it was ruled as in Chant that a bill of costs was a privileged history of the 
transaction in chronological order, but it was equally recognized that the applicant 
was entitled to details about how the constituent sums were composed. 
The statement on the status with respect to privilege of lawyers’ bills of costs 
as it is found in the contemporary Halsbury should be compared with its equivalent in 
earlier editions. In fact, the particular matter is stated almost identically in the first-
edition version in 1910 in the entry on ‘Discovery, Inspections and Interrogatories’18. 
The relevant passage in the latter recurs either verbatim or with only cosmetic 
linguistic amendment in all the subsequent editions up to and including the current, 
fifth, one. The second-edition version appearing in 1933 from Sir Alexander Adair 
Roche and Edmund Gibbs Kimber,19 the third-edition version appearing in 1955 from 
George Shorrock Ashcombe Wheatcroft, the fourth-edition version of 2001 from 
                                                 
13 See JA Hamilton, ‘Hall, Sir Charles (1814–1883)’, rev Catherine Pease-Watkin, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, at www.oxforddnb.com. 
14 RE Megarry, ‘The Vice-Chancellors’ (1982) 98 LQR 370-405. This is also a useful general source 
on the status of the Vice-Chancellors’ Courts. 
15 [1890] SJ 39. 
16 See Theobald Mathew, ‘Stirling, Sir James (1836–1916)’, rev Patrick Polden, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, at www.oxforddnb.com. 
17 [1915-1916] 32 TLR 592. 
18 Above (n 4) vol 2 (1910) 75. 
19 Above (n 5) vol 10 (1933) 384-5 under ‘Discovery, Inspections and Interrogatories’. 
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Harman John Leslie, and the fifth-edition one of 2009 without exactly attributed 
authorship, are all essentially as in the corresponding text in the first, 1910, version. 
Thus, the principal difference between the version in the third edition of 1955 (and the 
earlier editions) and that in the current edition is a modest variation in printing format 
and a translation into English of a Latinism (publici juris, literally ‘of’ but 
conventionally ‘in the public domain’) in the text of the third and earlier editions. 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to infer that, given the apparent first use of the cases in 
the 1910 version for the claim that lawyers’ bills of cost are as a rule generally 
privileged, this has simply been copied by all the authors of the respective texts in the 
later editions, probably automatically and almost certainly without recourse to what 
these original cases actually said and what their precise circumstances were.20 
It thus becomes of interest to ask who was responsible for the original 
formulation on lawyers’ bills of costs in the first edition of Halsbury and to consider 
claims for their revered status. The authors of the entry in Halsbury were His Honour 
Judge Bray and Robert Ernest Ross. Bray was initially a Barrister-at-Law in Lincoln’s 
Inn and from 1919 His Honour Judge Sir Edward Bray; he had obtained a BA from 
Cambridge in 1873 and in 1910 was a County Court Judge on the South Eastern 
Circuit in London; he had also at one point played cricket for Surrey, doubtless as a 
‘gentleman’. Ross was a barrister-at-law in the Middle Temple; he had obtained an 
LLB from the University of London in 1898, was one of the sub-editors of the first 
edition of Halsbury, and later became the Principal Clerk of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal at the Royal Courts of Justice.21 Because of their importance in unravelling 
the story of how to Chant and Turton was arrogated the status that they came to have, 
                                                 
20 All editions of Halsbury, from 1st to 5th, also use Chant as one of many cases to support the principle 
that ‘evidence of opinion or belief is also admitted for the purpose of proving handwriting where direct 
evidence of one who was present when the document was written is not available.’ Eg, above (n 4) vol 
13 (1910) 820 607 in the entry on ‘Evidence’, to which no fewer than seven authors contributed 
including Sidney Lowell Phipson and James Robert Vernam Marchant, the latter perhaps better known 
as the co-compiler of an edition of Cassell’s Latin Dictionary. 
21 For some reason he has been omitted from the class list of 1898 graduates in law given in the 
respective University of London Calendar and so the class of his degree is not ascertainable; see 
Calendar of the University of London for the Year 1898-99 (For the University, London 1898) and in 
immediately subsequent Calendars. He appears only in a consolidated listing of all graduates of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of London in the same year-issue (p 128); see also subsequent 
Calendars for similar listings. 
He later also edited Russell on Crime: A Treatise on Felonies and Misdemeanours, 2 vols (9th 
edn Stevens and Sons/Sweet and Maxwell, London 1936) and was joint editor, with Maxwell Turner, 
of Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases With the Statutes, Precedents of 
Indictments, etc. and the Evidence Necessary to Support Them (30th edn Sweet & Maxwell/Stevens & 
Sons, London 1938). ‘Russell’ was Sir William Oldnall Russell (c. 1784-1833), who was a legal writer 
and judge in India. ‘Archbold’ was John Frederick Archbold (1785-1870), a barrister and legal writer. 
 6 
these authors and their works are discussed separately below in summarizing the legal 
literature on the treatment of the two cases. 
 Thus, two nineteenth-century cases, Chant and Turton, were the legal 
cornerstone more or less to the present day of how lawyers’ bills of costs became 
privileged. For, despite systematic challenge by some contemporary commentators 
and even in some case law (though the best such examples are from Australia or New 
Zealand rather than from Britain), this remains the statement of the current legal 
position in perhaps the most widely quoted encyclopaedic statement of current law, 
published in 2009, and is still being quoted or referred to in recent judgments 
asserting the privileged status of lawyers’ bills of costs. 
There are certainly modern cases that follow the conventional Halsbury view 
on the matter, even if probably routinely and without any consideration of the relevant 
precedents or sometimes without having referred to the original cases. A well-known 
recent example is International Business Machines Corp and Another v Phoenix 
International (Computers) Ltd.22 This case clearly went to the matter of whether 
communications between a solicitor and client attract privilege, although it was not 
centrally concerned as to whether solicitors’ bills of costs sui generis were so 
privileged. It was merely that such bills were among the apparently voluminous 
material in dispute after their inadvertent disclosure, most of which involved 
substantive legal advice on the matters between the parties and so was what was 
centrally relevant to their dispute. It was thereupon assumed in the judgment that a 
‘hypothetical reasonable solicitor’ ought to know that they were privileged. Although 
the judgment follows the standard ‘line’ on bills of costs, neither party to that 
litigation had apparently raised specifically the status of a bill of costs as a class of 
document upon which a judgment concerning privilege was required. The judgment 
does cite, among three ‘older’ cases, both Chant and Turton but, it was clearly using 
them only as routine ‘background’ cases to be automatically cited in any matter where 
the privileged status of bills of costs was an ingredient. Neither case is referred to or 
discussed in the body of the case report and, suggesting even less real interest in the 
original, Turton in the cited cases is actually called ‘Turner’.23 The relevant passages 
of Halsbury are noted and one cannot but assume that Justice Aldous merely 
consulted his Halsbury and cited (albeit carelessly) the cases found therein supporting 
                                                 
22 [1995] 1 All ER 413, FSR 184. 
23 At 415 in the All ER version. 
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the view that lawyers’ bills of cost attract privilege. A more recent case in the 
Chancery Division24 followed the IBM/Phoenix position, citing both Chant and 
Turton – though noting that the latter, in asserting the status of solicitors’ bills, did not 
‘add much in the way of reasons’, but thus suggesting that the original case was at 
least actually consulted; however, this 2001 case does not mention Halsbury. 
 It is in fact in the Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions where some of the 
less conservative statements on the status of lawyers’ bills of costs with respect to 
legal professional privilege have been expressed. However, here too is at least one 
recent case asserting the conservative position. Master Kennedy-Grant in the 
Auckland High Court25 cited Master Williams QC in Crane v Dickson26 for his 
review of the traditional case law and his use of Halsbury, Chant, and Ainsworth v 
Wilding,27 to claim that lawyers’ bills of costs were necessarily privileged. Kennedy-
Grant, however, after his own extensive review of the local case law and issues 
involved, himself ruled that bills of costs were not brought into existence for ‘the 
purpose of getting or giving confidential legal advice and assurance’ and therefore 
were not privileged. He repeated his judgment, for the same reasons, in a further case 
some months later where lawyers’ bills of costs were also an issue.28 
 A somewhat more recent Australian case in the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Territory was obliged to rule on similar issues, equally coming to the 
conclusion that a lawyer’s bill of costs was not per se privileged.29 Chief Justice 
Martin noted that ‘bills of costs are not privileged per se’ but ‘they will however be 
privileged to the extent that they contain or refer directly to confidential matters so as 
to disclose the subject of the communication’. On that basis various lawyers’ bills 
were adjudged not privileged. 
The conservative view of legal professional privilege, that it operates as an 
absolute defence against disclosure, is well stated in an Australian case from the New 
                                                 
24 Dickinson (t/a Dickinson Equipment Finance) v Rushmer (t/a FJ Associates) [2001] Ch Div (21 
December). 
25 Re Merit Finance and Investment Group Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 152. Thanks are due to Maria Bell, law-
specialist librarian at the London School of Economics Library, for her assistance in the Internet search 
for the Australian and New Zealand cases that have been located and cited. 
26 Wellington, CP 425/86 (11 December 1989); this is an unreported case and it has not proved possible 
to acquire the original case report. 
27 [1900] 2 Ch 315. 
28 Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 209. 
29 Alcoota & Anor v CLC [Central Land Council] & Ors NTSC 30 (2 May 2001). 
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South Wales Court of Appeal.30 Chief Justice Spigelman said: ‘One feature which 
distinguishes a claim of legal professional privilege from a claim of public interest 
immunity, is that in the case of the former there is no process of balancing conflicting 
public interests. The law has already undertaken the process of balancing in 
determining the rule.’ 
 However, that position – though doubtless once sustainable in English law – is 
certainly no longer generally so. Among exemptions that may be claimed with respect 
to information requested of public authorities under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 is, in s 42, legal professional privilege. However, this is only a qualified 
exemption (requiring a balance between the public interest in, respectively, disclosure 
and non-disclosure), since s 42 is not among the sections listed in s 2(3) of the Act 
whose engagement implies an absolute exemption. 
 
 
3. The Current Alternative View in English Law Concerning Lawyers’ Bills of Costs 
 
These cases from Australia and New Zealand are interesting for the revelation that, 
even in some Anglo-Saxon legal jurisdictions, more flexible approaches to this issue 
have been propounded. What, however, about English law itself? 
 Halsbury, whilst clearly highly regarded, remains only the opinion of the legal 
commentators who wrote the originally passages in question and, one has to suppose, 
of those later editors who have copied these without significant amendments into 
subsequent editions. Other legal commentators are equally cited by case law as 
authorities and their views may deserve equal respect. Despite the claim made 
concerning the supposed pre-eminence of Halsbury, the view that it gives on many 
legal matters tends perhaps to the conservative,31 and indeed sometimes uninformed 
by contemporary debates. A case may be made that this is certainly true concerning 
what it says about the privilege attracted by legal bills of costs, especially in the 
contemporary climate of public accountability. Instead, the principle of redaction of 
disclosed material is now a well-accepted one, removing either by indelible deletion 
                                                 
30 Egan v Chadwick and Ors [1999] NSWCA 176 (10 June 1999). 
31 It might be remarked that Halsbury himself, undoubtedly eminent in his time and since, made a 
distinctive conservative, if temporary, contribution to employment law. As Lord Chancellor, he was a 
principal actor in the notorious Taff Vale decision by the House of Lords in 1901; Taff Vale Railway 
Company v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426. 
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or physical extraction matter that is inappropriately sensitive or, if disclosed to an 
opponent, would be prejudicial to the interest of the discloser by perhaps providing an 
unacceptable litigation advantage to an opponent. The format and detail of solicitors’ 
bills have probably long been variable, perhaps depending on the perceived 
expectations and importance of the client, the resources of the solicitor concerned, and 
the branch of law upon which advice has been provided. Some solicitors’ bills may be 
routinely presented to clients with extensive and elaborate itemization of all the 
individual activities that were being billed for. However, other solicitors’ bills are not 
so presented and could be described as a ‘history of the transaction’ only with a 
minimalist concept of what is a ‘history’. One is sure that most solicitors would 
always be willing to provide bills intricately itemized if so requested, but might in 
some cases want to charge extra for the additional service. Some bills may comprise 
little more than the total amount, perhaps also any individual amounts summing to 
this total, (in recent decades) a VAT calculation on the whole, and some such overall 
description as ‘To our professional charges for advice and services . . .’ Further 
itemization, if any, will be separate. It is certainly difficult to see how merely the 
amounts billed for and such vague and anodyne itemizations could of themselves 
provide a litigation advantage in most sorts of case. If more detailed itemizations were 
provided and were of such detail as to reveal, say, the precise nature of legal advice, 
or its content, then of course that might, in ongoing litigation, be privileged and could 
be redacted. 
Doubtless with such distinctions in mind, the principle of possible redaction is 
well stated in the first current major and no-nonsense challenge on this matter in 
English law against the orthodoxy of Halsbury, which appeared in the fifteenth 
edition of Phipson on Evidence32 in the chapter on legal professional privilege written 
by Charles Simon Hollander. This is of significance because the passage differed 
crucially from the equivalent one prepared by an earlier author of the fourteenth 
edition of Phipson, which had appeared in 1990. Hollander was a contributor to 
Phipson for the first time with its fifteenth edition and brought a new and 
contemporary perspective to the issue. He says, referencing Chant and Turton: 
 
There is some old authority that lawyers’ feenotes are privileged from 
production. There is no reason why there should be a rule that this should be so . 
                                                 
32 MN Howard (ed), Phipson on Evidence (15th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 20−20, 517-518. 
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. . . The better view is that solicitor’s bills are capable of attracting privilege if 
their contents betray or may betray the nature of the legal advice given. . . . It 
may thus be permissible to blank out relevant parts of the bill. 
 
By the seventeenth edition of Phipson, in the corresponding passage also written 
by Hollander, he comes down even more fully than in the fifteenth edition in favour 
of redaction.33 What is said about lawyers’ fee-notes has been revised even from the 
previous, sixteenth, edition so that these paragraphs now firmly support the principle 
of revelation of non-litigation-relevant material, whilst prescribing redaction before 
disclosure to remove potentially sensitive matter. 
 
Old authority suggests that feenotes are privileged. It was so held in Chant v 
Brown, where Turner V.C. said that such bills are privileged on the ground that 
“an attorney’s bill of costs is, in truth, his history of the transaction in which he 
has been concerned”. In Turton v Barber, Hall V.C. took the same view, 
although there is not much by way of reasoning. In “Daily Express” (1908) Ltd 
v Mountain the Court of Appeal again held that a bill of costs was privileged 
because it contained the history of the transaction in chronological order, 
although Swinfen Eady L.J. recognised that the applicant was entitled to 
particulars as to how the sums were made up. . . . Bray34 stated that solicitors’ 
bills of costs were privileged. More recently, Aldous J. said in IBM v Phoenix 
International (Computers) Ltd that a reasonable solicitor would have been in no 
doubt that solicitors’ bills disclosed on discovery were privileged documents 
disclosed by mistake, and River J. held, following the above authorities, that 
solicitors’ bills are privileged in John Dickinson v Duncan Rushmer. 
In most cases, solicitors’ bills of costs will not be disclosable because they 
will not be relevant. In cases where they are relevant, there can be no doubt that 
solicitors’ bills are capable of attracting privilege if their contents betray or may 
betray the nature of the legal advice given, and that such an analysis is 
consistent with the Balabel35 approach. It is suggested that a blanket rule is 
neither necessary nor consistent with modern principles of privilege. The way in 
which bills are submitted is a matter of practice and will vary with time, and 
there is no reason why the court should be hidebound by old authorities. If a bill 
of costs does not reveal anything as to the contents of the communications 
between lawyer and client, why should it attract privilege? An approach which 
has much to commend it is that taken in New Zealand where it has been held 
that bills of costs and statements of account are not privileged by their nature, 
but that they may be privileged, or parts may be blanked out, if disclosure would 
in respect of the particular bill tend to reveal the privileged matters.36 
                                                 
33 Hodge M Malek (ed), Phipson on Evidence (17th edn Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, London 
2010) 23–52, 668-9. 
34 Ie, Edward Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (Reeves and Turner, London 1885), but 
see infra on the actual tentativeness of this reference. 
35 Balabel and Another v Air-India, CA [1988] 1 Ch 317, 2 All ER 246, 2 WLR 1036. 
36 Exactly the same passage appears in Hollander’s single-authored work; see Charles Hollander, 
Documentary Evidence (10th edn Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, London 2009) 12-12, 266–7. 
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4. The Status of Halsbury as ‘the Last Word’ on the State of the Law 
 
The authority to be given to works that purport to be statements of the law or 
commentaries on, or claimed clarifications of, the law (as opposed to the authority of 
the actual law or to its interpretations by case law) has, of course, produced many 
comments in legal judgments. Nor is there any difficulty in finding judgments that 
have referred, explicitly or by implication, to such works and have been guided by 
what they have said. Many examples could be cited. 
 However, Halsbury has not been the only work in the twentieth century that 
sought to give a comprehensive and encyclopaedic general statement of English law 
on every law-related matter. There was also the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of 
England With Forms and Precedents by the Most Eminent Legal Authorities. A 
second edition (‘revised and enlarged’) of this work, edited by Alexander [later, Sir 
Alexander] Wood Renton and Max[well] Alexander Robertson, appeared between 
1906 and 1909. This was published in fifteen volumes by Sweet & Maxwell, and then 
with two supplementary volumes. Volume 16 included amendments and additions to 
the end of 1913, whilst Volume 17, edited by Bertram Jacobs, included these to the 
end of 1918. Production of this work seems to have expired, leaving the field to 
Halsbury, because of the Second World War. A full third edition was being published 
by Sweet & Maxwell from 1938, when its first volume appeared. It reached only its 
fifth volume in 1940, which was the last ever to appear. Its Editor-in-Chief, Sir Ernst 
Arthur Jelf, was already aged seventy-two in 1940 and died in 1949, perhaps 
removing the final impetus to extend the series. 
 Referring back to the second edition, it is relevant in connection with the 
content of the present article that nowhere in the entire seventeen-volume work is 
either Chant case or Turton cited. The entry on ‘Evidence’, written by Joseph Gerald 
Pease in Volume 5 (1907), 378, in discussing legal professional privilege mentions 
several cases, including two still often cited (Greenough and Minet, both mentioned 
below). There is no mention of the status of lawyers’ bills of costs issued by them. 
Likewise, the entry on ‘Interrogatories’, written by Edward Louis de Hart in Volume 
7 (1907), 417, mentions legal professional privilege in the context of discovery; again, 
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however, there is no specific reference to lawyers’ bills of costs, nor to Chant or 
Turton. 
 It is intriguing to speculate whether, if it had been Halsbury’s further 
production that was somehow curtailed by the War and if Fate had then reversed the 
respective life-spans of the Encyclopaedia and of Halsbury, there would be any 
contemporary citations as precedents of these nineteenth-century cases. 
Halsbury has thus become the more enduring and is the work that has, perhaps 
because of its periodic new editions, come closest to attaining the patina of last-word 
authority on the state of the law at any particular time. It is a work whose editors and 
contributors have for the most part been practising lawyers, predominantly barristers 
and judges of varying seniority rather than solicitors. It remains only an expression of 
the legal opinions of its contributing authors and, illustrious though these may be, 
their opinions may be subject to challenge as appropriate. Still, Halsbury is surely 
more than a ‘textbook’, as it is described by McLeod,37 a description usually given to 
works written by academic lawyers (some of whom may of course also practise 
professionally, usually as barristers). 
 It is not difficult to find examples of other respected authorities on the state of 
the law, or of commentaries in law textbooks, articles and the like, that reject, either 
explicitly or by clear implication, a statement of the law as found in the relevant 
edition of Halsbury. It is less easy to find actual legal cases that do so. However, two 
examples do show that Halsbury’s statements of the law are not always to be 
considered sacrosanct by the courts. They are on occasion judged as simply wrong.38 
The first example is Watson v Thomas S Whitney & Co., Ltd and Another,39 
which found against a statement in the third edition of Halsbury about whether the 
Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear a particular appeal. The case had started in 
the Liverpool Court of Passage in the days when various cities had their own 
‘particular courts’; decisions of this Court of Passage were given by its registrar. 
Halsbury said that ‘appeals from the registrar on other than interlocutory matters lie to 
                                                 
37 See McLeod (n 2) 99. 
38 Dissent even from the highest legal authority has a very honourable pedigree; see, for example, the 
iconic early work of legal scholarship by James [later, Sir James] Wigram, Points in the Law of 
Discovery (Charles Hunter, London 1836). Despite its modest size, this is a major legal attack on some 
leading judgments of his time. However, the work has little of relevance on solicitor/client privilege. 
39 AC [1966] 1 All ER 122, [1966] 1 WLR 57, 130 JP 109. 
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a divisional court of the Queen’s Bench Division’.40 It was Lord Justice Diplock, in 
the Court’s third judgment, who determined after assuaging his initial doubts that, 
against Halsbury and after an inspection of the authority cited by Halsbury but then of 
the relevant section of the Liverpool Corporation Act 1921, it was the Court of 
Appeal which did have jurisdiction on the appeal in question. 
The other example is Ex parte Weber,41which found against a one-time 
German national Antonius Charles Frederick Weber, who had not naturalized and 
who at the time of the First World War was claiming, on the basis of a more-than-ten-
years absence from Germany, to be stateless and therefore not liable to internment as 
an enemy alien; the statelessness was the alleged implication of the German 
nationality statute of 1873. Although Halsbury was not explicitly referred to, it is 
known from records in the National Archives42 that the Home Office was worried 
about the implication of an albeit tentative footnote statement in the first edition of 
Halsbury43 suggesting that such a person might be stateless if he had not become a 
naturalized Briton, and it was apprehensive about putting the matter to a test before 
the courts. 
The rejection of the appellant’s case was on the basis of the requirements of a 
German military statute of 1874 which said that ‘Germans who had lost their 
nationality and had not acquired any other were bound, on returning to Germany in 
order to take up permanent residence there, to present themselves for military service, 
provided that they were not bound to serve in time of peace after the completion of 
their thirty-first year’ – to quote the headnote of the case report. Given the state of 
war, the provision self-evidently would not have excused Weber from military service 
if he had returned permanently to Germany, irrespective of his more than ten years’ 
absence. The German law also provided for advantages with respect to nationality for 
long-absent former Germans returning to Germany who wanted to renew their 
German nationality, advantages that were denied to those who had never had such 
nationality. Accordingly, Weber’s application for a writ of habeas corpus failed. 
                                                 
40 Above (n 6), vol 9 1152 504. The title in question in Halsbury was prepared by Sir Raymond 
Evershed (as he then was, Master of the Rolls), Victor Martin Reeves Goodman, John Dallas Waters, 
and John Harold Ellison. 
41 [1916] 1 KB 280; [1916] 1 AC 421. 
42 See National Archives, HO45/10734/258157. 
43 Above (n 4), vol 1 662 302. The authors of this entry were William Ernst Browning, William 
Haldane Porter, and Cecil Bertram Gedge. 
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Despite Halsbury, though he was no longer German, he was apparently not quite un-
German enough, and he continued to be banged up as an enemy alien. 
 
 
5. The Status of Chant and Turton as Case-Law Precedents for the Privilege of 
Solicitors’ Bills of Costs 
 
As Chant and Turton are still routinely cited as authority for solicitors’ bills of costs 
being privileged, these cases, though long-standing, have not been formally overruled 
by any precedent-setting court, despite the odd chink made in their armour. Until they 
are, one has to assume that their authority remains the essential position under English 
law. Indeed, we suggest that they are often cited by present-day commentators and in 
present-day case law without reference to what the cases themselves actually say or 
most certainly ignorant of what their contemporaries said about them. In fact, with 
some few exceptions to be discussed below, the citations of each of these cases made 
by the numerous of their contemporarily respected commentators in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries whose writings have been consulted do not cite them for 
the purpose of establishing specifically that a solicitor’s bill of costs to his client is 
privileged. It is instructive to examine how, if at all, these cases were used and treated 
in the numerous treatises on discovery or on evidence throughout the second half of 
the nineteenth century through to the baldly uncomplicated statement of the relevance 
of Chant and Turton together in support of the privileged status of a bill of costs seen 
in the first edition of Halsbury, and repeated verbatim in the single-authored work on 
discovery by one of the Halsbury contributors that appeared in 1912. 
 What follows are brief outlines of what Chant and Turton were actually about 
and how the issue of a solicitor’s bill of costs insinuated itself into their proceedings. 
After that is given what is sought to be as comprehensive a review as possible of the 
relevant law texts appearing from 1852 to 1912,44 focussing on the most relevant 
editions of what, like many law books then and now, were often many-editioned 
publications and, where different editions of the same work are introduced, doing so 
                                                 
44 For a comprehensive statement on the general status of professional privilege in the immediately pre-
Chant era, see S March Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, With Considerable Alterations 
and Additions, 2 vols (9th edn Saunders and Benning, London 1843) vol 1 162-76. However, there is no 
specific discussion there of lawyers’ bills of costs as a class of documents and Chant does seem to be 
the first case where their status with respect to privilege was an issue. 
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only when there has been a significant change between editions. In the course of this 
review, we necessarily also touch upon how the concept of legal professional 
privilege evolved in nineteenth-century case law to the point that any communication 
between solicitor and client was normally considered to attract client privilege, so that 
some authors seemed to assume – explicitly or by implication – that lawyers’ bills of 
costs were privileged without the apparent need to assert any specific case-law 
authority for this. As we shall see, it is indeed only with the first edition of Halsbury 
that these cases were originally set down as unvarnished prescriptive authority for the 
privileged status of solicitors’ bills of costs. 
 
 
A. Chant v Brown [1852] 9 Hare 79045 
 
This case was one of the many in the first half of the nineteenth century that arose 
from the general uncertainty at the time about issues of legal ownership and transfer 
of property, issues that, according to one writer, fuelled the demand for proper civil 
registration because birth-dates and legitimacy and a method of proving these were 
often important in property and probate disputes of the time.46 Explaining briefly 
quite what this case was about is not made easier by the fact that the events at issue 
occurred over a near-fifty year period and involved a cast of characters almost as 
numerous as in a Tolstoy novel. Even counting only the living, there were two 
plaintiffs (Chant and his wife) and as many as twelve defendants. A further source of 
complication is that the relevant dramatis personae contain three different women 
forenamed ‘Mary’. The principal facts are taken from the fuller account in Chant(I),47 
                                                 
45 A detail that seems to have escaped all reports except two (see infra, nn 47 and 75), then and since, 
was that the correct spelling is ‘Browne’, not ‘Brown’, as is clear from the Court of Chancery’s original 
hand-written records, plus census and probate records. The correctly spelt surname is used when the 
persons concerned are referred to. 
46 Edward Higgs, Life, Death and Statistics: Civil Registration, Censuses and the Work of the General 
Register Office, 1836-1952 (Local Population Studies, Hatfield 2004) 8–9; however, birth-dates and 
legitimacy were not particularly issues in this case. 
47 Many of the records of this case survive in the Chancery records hand-written on vellum in the 
National Archives, indexed (correctly) as Chant v Browne [National Archives, C14/800/C28]. These 
include the plaintiffs’ original bill of complaint, the several answers of the defendants to this, the 
amended bill of complaint and the corresponding answers to that, plus a sworn statement of witnesses’ 
answers to interrogatories arising from the amended bill. Chant (I), as Chant v Brown, did achieve a 
short report in The Times on 19 January 1849, specifically reporting only the point that a solicitor with 
a personal interest in a transaction none the less could expect professional privilege about it. There was 
no report in The Times concerning Chant. There was a notice in The Times (10 November 1851) that it 
was to be heard that day and a law notice also in The Times, on 24 May 1852, that the case was ‘For 
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supplemented by other research on the persons concerned. The case reports of both 
Chant(I) and Chant concern only a determination of matters of legal evidence that had 
arisen and were not substantive judgments on the plaintiffs’ actual complaint, despite 
the announcement of a scheduled judgment in the law notices of The Times on 24 
May 1852. If a substantive judgment was indeed given, it was not included in the 
Chant report. Between Chant(I) and Chant there was an amendment order on the case 
dated 10 February 1849. The judgment in Chant(I) came from the original bill of 
complaint of 15 February 1848, and that of Chant was from the amended bill of 
complaint dated 23 February 1849. 
There were in fact six Brownes involved among the defendants, but the most 
significant was Augustus Pulsford Browne, followed by George Townsend Browne. 
The case was indeed about principles of discovery and legal professional privilege, 
the former defendant being a solicitor and the latter a legal counsel. The two Brownes 
had at an earlier stage in Chant been asked by the principal plaintiff, Robert Chant a 
wine and spirits merchant, to disclose material that they had withheld on ground of 
privilege. This ‘exception to sufficiency’ had been allowed by ‘the Master’48 and so 
the case before Sir James Wigram in the Vice-Chancellors’ Courts was essentially an 
appeal against that lower decision. 
 Back in 1805 Edward Melton, a farmer, and his wife Mary (born about 1781) 
made a settlement at their marriage whereby their joint posthumous interest in a 
Devonshire estate should devolve by default equally on to all of their children, or on 
to one or more of them as he, Edward, should think fit – an arrangement that one 
could have predicted might bring later grief! There were five children of the marriage. 
Edward Melton died in 1834 and Mary, his wife, in 1847. One of the five children 
was Margaretta, who was born in 1817 and had married Robert Chant (born in 1810) 
at South Molton in 1839. Another was Mary Melton, who had been born in 1807 but 
never married. In May 1828 Edward, by a legitimate deed of settlement, had given 
sole interest in the estate to his daughter Mary Melton, which occurred shortly after 
her twenty-first birthday. Then, there was a further arrangement in September 1828 
between Edward Melton, Mary his wife, Mary his unmarried daughter, a John 
                                                                                                                                            
Judgment’ on that day. This suggests that the legal points raised by the case were picked up by the 
reports, but that there was little interest in the final substantive outcome of the proper case. 
48 This would have been the Master of the Rolls. Before the abolition of the post in English law in the 
reform of Chancery in 1852, there had been an office called Master in Chancery, which was one of the 
twelve assistants of the Lord Chancellor, the chief of these being Master of the Rolls. 
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Timewell, and the defendant Augustus Pulsford Browne, to transfer the interest in the 
estate to John Timewell as security for a mortgage of £4,600, which was then paid to 
Edward Melton and the money used by him for his own purposes. John Timewell, 
however, died in 1836 but bequeathed his interest to the defendant George Townsend 
Browne, and to his nephew Francis Timewell upon trust for the separate use of Mary 
the wife of August Pulsford Browne for life, the remainder to Augustus Pulsford 
Browne for life. John Timewell had appointed Mary Pulsford Browne, George 
Townsend Browne and Francis Timewell as his executors. Chant’s pleading was 
essentially that the May 1828 arrangement, but particularly that of September 1828, 
were a fraudulent exercise by Edward Melton, intended to provide for himself money 
that was really for the benefit of his children, and that before advancing the money 
John Timewell knew of the nature of this fraud by Edward Melton. As evidence of 
this, Chant alleged that Augustus Pulsford Browne had been the solicitor of John 
Timewell and of Edward Melton in the preparation of the deed and the mortgage and 
so necessarily knew the nature of the transaction. Further, he pleaded that these facts 
of the case were in an account of the proceedings prepared at the time between 
Edward Melton and Augustus Pulsford Browne, and by then in the possession of the 
latter. Chant sought to have the appointment deed of May 1828 and the mortgage 
deed of September 1828 set aside on the ground of the alleged fraud of Edward 
Melton and of the knowledge of this by John Timewell. The effect of that would have 
been that the estate, or a share of it, would go to Chant via his wife’s interest in it. 
 Sir James Wigram’s arguments in favour of the privilege of the Brownes are 
set out at length in Chant(I), especially relying on the treatment of the 
comprehensiveness and durability of privilege in Phillipps’ Treatise on Evidence 
(presumably the ninth edition), although he, or the case reporter, showed the typical 
lawyers’ foible by misspelling Phillipps’ name. 
 Chant, three years later, was concerned with two particular privileged matters, 
including two aspects of the status of a solicitor’s bill of costs. The Brownes now 
sought to suppress material that they must have thought harmful to their defence but 
they did so on the ground that its disclosure would be in breach of professional 
confidence. One of the items that they sought to suppress was a hand-written bill of 
costs prepared in connection with the Melton case by one William Thorne, clerk to 
Augustus Pulsford Browne, that was referred in the so-called ‘fifth interrogatory’ as 
document N. Sir George James Turner, a Vice-Chancellor after Wigram’s resignation, 
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was willing to allow it only to the extent of proving the handwriting of the witness, 
summarising his view on the general principle of its admissibility with the sentence: 
‘An attorney’s bill of costs is, in truth, his history of the transactions in which he has 
been concerned; and if he cannot be called to prove the facts I think his clerk cannot 
be called to prove the history of them’. This statement is absolute and makes no 
concession to the likely variety of itemizing detail in bills of costs. 
 All parties involved emerged from the experience of the case without too 
much apparent long-term damage. Robert Chant lived on till 1901, dying of ‘natural 
decay’ at the age of ninety-one. His wife Margaretta had died in 1899 aged eighty-
three. Between them from 1840 to 1864 they managed to produce at least eight sons 
and three daughters, only one of whom died very young. Mary Melton remained a 
spinster and died in 1890 at the age of eighty-two. There were presumably no hard 
feelings between her and the Chants as she was living with them as housekeeper in 
1871 and her sister Margaretta was with her when she died. None, however, left an 
administered or probated will. Augustus Pulsford Browne died in 1875 aged eighty-
four, leaving an estate of under £800. His wife Mary had died in 1867 aged seventy-
three. George Townsend Browne had died in 1856, probably aged about seventy-four. 
Francis Timewell, an affluent farmer, died in 1860 aged sixty-four. 
 
 
B. Turton v Barber [1874] LR 17 Eq 329 
 
This case is initially intriguing in that, unusually, the name of neither protagonist 
appears in the now-cited case report of 1874. Why this is so will become clear from 
the following discussion. The case was occasioned by matters arising from the estate 
of Thomas Hincks of Willenhall in Staffordshire, who died aged ninety on 23 
November 1865 and is described as a ‘gentleman’. His will, proved at Lichfield on 1 
January 1866, named his daughters Sarah Barber, a widow, and Mary Hincks, wife of 
Joseph Hincks (a wine merchant) as his executrixes. This Joseph Hincks, to be 
identified as ‘the elder’, was not actually an executor of the estate. The will plus its 
two codicils is quite a lengthy document, briefly mentions mining, but contains no 
specific mention of the named mines featured in the 1874 case report. 
 Turton arose from complaints in two cases that the executrixes of Thomas 
Hincks’ estate were not fulfilling their duties of office. The bill of complaint of 
Frederic Turton (a surgeon), Mary his wife and Sarah Hincks a spinster against the 
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defendants Sarah Barber, Joseph Hincks (the elder) and Mary his wife was filed in the 
Court of Chancery before Vice-Chancellor Stuart49 on 14 September 1866. Mary 
Turton and Sarah Hincks were granddaughters of the testator the elder Thomas 
Hincks, being two of the surviving children of Thomas Hincks (the younger), the 
testator’s deceased son who had died on 1 November 1862. The executrixes of the 
will were accused in the Turton/Hincks bill of complaint variously of having 
appropriated Thomas Hincks’ personal estate, of having entered into his real estate, 
and of failing to provide a proper accounting of the estate. Just a couple of months 
before, on 13 July 1866, Joseph Hincks the younger and John Charles Hawkesford 
Hincks (both sons of Mary Hincks and Joseph Hincks the elder) had entered a similar 
complaint in the Court of Chancery before the Master of the Rolls against the same 
defendants (except that Barber is here listed lasted). 
 In the case of Turton the Hinckses filed a joint answer on 9 November 1866 
seeking to exculpate themselves and putting the blame for any default on to Sarah 
Barber. She in turn had filed a robust defence of her conduct in an answer dated 26 
October 1866 specifically against the charges against her made by the junior 
Hinckses.50 
 The case then continued intermittently. On 14 January 1867 there was a 
hearing before Vice-Chancellor Stuart. Doubtless as a result of this, a decree from the 
Court of Chancery dated 25 February 1867 was published in The Times of 2 March 
requiring all with a claim against the estate of Thomas Hincks deceased to specify the 
nature of that claim and to produce it to Vice-Chancellor Stuart. Although there is no 
known surviving documentation on the matter, it must surely have been in response to 
this that Matthew Tildesley and John Harper, who figure prominently in the case 
report, came forward with their claim against the estate. 
 Except for the 1874 deposition, there is no surviving documentation as how 
the case then proceeded, but it is known that there was a brief hearing of it before 
Vice-Chancellor Sir John Wickens51 on 9 February 1872. 
                                                 
49 Sir John Stuart (1793-1876), Vice-Chancellor from 1852 to 1871. 
50 Some limited material from both cases survives in the records of the Court of Chancery in the 
National Archives. The file of Turton v Barber [National Archives, C16/380/T114] contains the 
plaintiffs’ bill of complaint, two answers (in fact, the joint answer of the Hinckses in hand-written and 
printed versions) and the original hand-written deposition of the Special Examiner in 1874 that features 
prominently in the case report. The file of Hincks v Hincks [National Archives, C16/348/H174] 
contains the plaintiffs’ bill of complaint, interrogatories, and two answers (the answer of Sarah Barber 
in hand-written and printed versions). 
51 Sir John Wickens (1815-1873), Vice-Chancellor from 1871 to 1873. 
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The report on this case by Vice-Chancellor Hall that has been bequeathed to 
us as its only account52 is a perfunctory document. Hall was the third Vice-Chancellor 
since 1866 to have had this case before him and, as with the two Chant reports, this 
one too concerns only some specific points of law that had arisen; it was not a 
judgment on the substantive merits of the proper case. The report is not written up 
quite as the next-morning account from back-of-a-menu jottings made during an 
evening of indulgence in Lincoln’s Inn but, despite the relative simplicity of the 
original issues, it reads as having a degree of superficiality. One can see the point of 
its present-day commentators who note that its argument on the status of a solicitor’s 
bill of costs is supported by not much in the way of reasoning. Even conceding the 
limited matters that it was determining, the report has none of Sir James Wigram’s 
elegant reasoning in Chant(I), nor even of Sir George James Turner’s in Chant – but 
then both these, especially Wigram, would be recognized now as nineteenth-century 
legal minds greatly superior to Hall’s. 
The facts on the specific matters in the case report are as follows, and there is 
nothing of the background of the other issues described above. The case report starts 
by saying that Joseph Hincks, described as ‘the testator in the cause’ (a mistake, of 
course, as it was really Thomas Hincks the elder, as discussed above), was the owner 
of two mines in Staffordshire and in 1864 negotiations were opened between him and 
Matthew Tildesley of a firm Harper & Tildesley for the lease of the two mines. The 
report says that adjoining these two mines was a third one, owned by a third party, 
whose acquisition was desirable in order to be able properly to work the first two 
mines – however, that information is a ‘lay obiter’ since it is not mentioned again in 
the report and has no apparent relevance to any of the principles of the case. In 1864 a 
preliminary agreement was entered into between the parties (ie, Thomas Hincks on 
the one hand and Tildesley and Harper on the other) for one lease on the first two 
mines. Then, complications having arisen, a lease on the first mine only was granted 
in June 1865, and an agreement for the lease of the second mine was drawn up, but 
the actual transfer was not made. Tildesley and Harper then made arrangements to 
work the two mines together, expending money on machinery and other equipment 
for the purpose. Then, in 1865 when Hincks died it was subsequently found 
impracticable actually to grant the lease on the second mine. Probably as a result of 
                                                 
52 Neither this particular hearing of the case nor details of its final denouement were reported in The 
Times. 
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the 1867 announcement for those claiming to be creditors of the Hincks estate, Harper 
and Tildesley made their claim for damages for what they had sustained by reason of 
the non-performance of the agreement to grant a lease on the second mine, having – 
so they claimed – expended their money to no purpose acting on their previous 
assumption that they would acquire the lease of the second mine. 
 In furtherance of this claim, Tildesley made three affidavits, whereupon he 
was required by the plaintiffs (ie, Turton et al.) to attend to be cross-examined on the 
matter before an officer known as the Special Examiner (named Francis Bacon!) and 
to bring with him the bill of costs delivered by his solicitor in the matter of the lease. 
Tildesley refused to answer, on the basis of lawyer-client privilege, a question about 
matters discussed between him and his solicitor concerning the preliminary agreement 
to lease both mines. He also refused to produce the bill of costs, which he had paid. 
The case then moved back to the Vice-Chancellors’ Court because the plaintiffs 
moved to have Tildesley to appear before it to answer the question that he had refused 
to answer and to produce the bill of costs that he had refused to produce. It was the 
former matter that was clearly the more important and Vice-Chancellor Hall, in 
dismissing arguments by the plaintiffs’ counsel in favour of admissibility and for an 
order to answer the question asked (these arguments included a quotation from an 
early edition of John Pitt Taylor’s work on evidence introduced below), said merely 
that Minet v Morgan53 had settled the matter that the protection of privilege also 
extended to communications in anticipation of or simply before litigation, and he 
would follow that guidance. The issues around the bill of costs were clearly secondary 
to Hall. His judgment merely says in conclusion: 
 
As to the bill of costs, that also is, in my opinion, privileged. The only object 
that could be in view in obtaining production of the document would be to get in 
the thin edge of the wedge, and so entangle the witness in the difficulty of 
answering other questions. A solicitor’s making an affidavit as to documents is 
no waiver of privilege. 
 
It is important to note that in Turton the issue of whether a solicitor’s bill of costs 
attracted privilege was not the head one of that case. Its more significant principle was 
                                                 
53 [1873] LR 8 Ch App 361. This important case, determined a year earlier in the Court of Appeal in 
Chancery by the Lord Chancellor Roundell Palmer, the first Earl of Selborne (1812-1895), made clear 
that there was no distinction in the attraction of privilege between communications between a solicitor 
and his/her client made with a view to litigation and those made before any litigation. 
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whether communications between solicitor and client made before litigation was 
anticipated were privileged, a decision determined in the positive. Indeed, to the 
extent that one can detect any reasoning behind Hall’s judgment on the bill of costs, it 
is permissible to infer that, in this case, its production would have given the plaintiffs 
an unacceptable litigation advantage, which is presumably how the phrase ‘to get in 
the thin edge of the wedge, and so entangle the witness in the difficulty of answering 
other questions’ is to be interpreted. The exact format of the bill of costs in the case is 
lost for ever but, if that interpretation of his phrasing is correct, the reason for his 
refusal to order disclosure was entirely concerned with the possibility of an improper 
litigation advantage – a concern as reasonable now as it apparently was then – and 
little or nothing to do with the status of a bill of costs as a class of document per se. 
The case report includes almost verbatim the text of the deposition of the 
Special Examiner, the original of which in its hand-written form survives in the 
Turton file in the National Archives. The report’s egregious error, probably made by 
the case reporter rather than by Hall himself, is the misidentification of the ‘testator in 
the cause’ as Joseph Hincks when it was really Thomas Hincks (the elder). 
The case must have been eventually decided against the plaintiffs since Joseph 
Hincks (the elder) did eventually receive satisfaction in the overall cause, although – 
with an irony that Charles Dickens would have appreciated – only after he had died! 
While a case of equity was being determined in Chancery, the disputed property 
would have been inaccessible to the possible beneficiaries. Joseph died of what was 
clearly a stroke on 5 August 1877 and the initial probate on his estate, dated 24 
August 1877, noted that his effects totalled under £2,000. However, the will was 
resworn in April 1878, with the effects now totalling under £9,000 though with no 
indication on the statement of probate about the source of all this additional money. 
Reswearing a will is a little uncommon but far from rare; however, most reswearings 
involve relatively minor adjustments, in relative terms, to the original total of effects. 
An increase of this relative magnitude is exceptional. It doubtless emerged through 
the eventual dismissal of the plaintiffs’ and of Tildesley’s and Harper’s claims against 
Thomas Hincks’ estate. Joseph’s estate would have had an ongoing interest in this 
outcome via his wife, Mary, prior to the effect of the Married Women’s Property Act 
1882. The case did Mary Hincks no harm, living on as she did until 11 July 1888 and 
managing to hang on to effects valued at £1,104 18s 5d at her death. 
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Sarah Barber was another whose finances were posthumously benefited. She 
had been born on 14 February 1808 and married a Joseph Barber on 28 November 
1831. He died in about 1858, significantly leaving Sarah a widow. The case report for 
Turton is dated 22 January 1874, but did not finally dispose of the case. For Sarah 
Barber died of a stroke on 15 August 1874,54 leaving an estate assessed initially at 
under £3,000 when her will was first proved at Birmingham on 4 November 1874. 
However, in October 1879, possibly in consequence of a hearing before Vice-
Chancellor Sir Richard Malins55 on 7 March 1879 on ’Barber’s Estate’, the will was 
resworn, giving her estate’s value as under £12,000. 
As for the fate of the Turtons: Frederic died on 24 February 1875, aged only 
thirty-eight, of ‘softening of the brain’ and epileptic seizures, a combination 
suggesting the possibility of syphilis. He left an estate valued at under £10,000. 
However, his widow Mary continued bringing up their five children and lived on 
without remarriage till 8 June 1931, dying at the age of ninety-two and leaving an 
estate, also after reswearing, of £4,031 15s 6d. Sarah Hincks, who was born in 1843 
and who suffered in childhood the death of her mother and a step-mother, plus the 
appearance of a further stepmother, married her first cousin William Fairbanks in 
1873 (see n 54); he died in 1908, but she lived on till 1930, dying in Dorking at the 
age of eighty-seven and leaving a modest £448 15s 4d. 
For Tildesley, this case, and others,56 seem to have broken him, even if he was 
not quite a real-life Richard Carstone. In 1871 he had been a hardware merchant and 
                                                 
54 Although there is no documentation to the effect, the case was clearly continuing after that date. The 
National Archives catalogue description of the case, presumably prepared at the time but after the date 
of Sarah Barber’s death, though there is no other surviving record of any of the extra names, is: 
Plaintiffs: Frederic Turton and Mary Turton his wife and another; Defendants: Sarah Barber (since 
deceased), Joseph Hincks and Mary Hincks his wife; Amendments: Amended by order 1868. 
Frederic Turton, Charles Grierson De Lessert and William Fairbanks added as [?] Amended by 
order to revive 1874. John Hincks and Edward Lucas added as defendants. 
The ‘[?]’ is as on the catalogue record, presumably as scanned from an illegible hand-written original, 
though the context suggests that the latter two names were added as plaintiffs, for in 1873 William 
Fairbanks (who qualified as a doctor on 1 August 1874) became the husband of Sarah Hincks and, as 
the husband, would have taken over the financial interest in the suit. It is not clear how De Lessert 
assumed an interest unless he was in, or anticipated being in, a professional partnership with Fairbanks; 
the former was a dentist and surgeon and in 1871 was living in Wolverhampton, having been born in 
Dublin in 1817 and dying in 1886. His wife had died in 1870, but she had no immediately obvious link 
to the case. John Hincks was undoubtedly the son of Mary Hincks and Joseph Hincks the elder but, 
although a plausible Edward Lucas has been identified, the reason for his involvement in the case is 
unclear. 
55 Sir Richard Malins (1805-1882), Vice-Chancellor from 1866 to 1881. 
56 Tildesley was heavily involved in litigation in the final decade of his life. In Staffordshire Joint Stock 
Bank (Limited) v Frederick John Cleaver and Others (including Tildesley) [National Archives, 
C16/892/S20], filed on 30 January 1873, the bank was seeking money owed to it by Tildesley and 
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owner of an iron foundry and manufactory employing 50 men. On his death from 
anaemia in January 1879, his effects were assessed at under £100. However, his 
widow, Mary Ann, was made of sterner stuff. She lived on till February 1908, dying 
of ‘senile decay’ at the age of ninety. She managed to leave a modest estate valued at 
£1,150 8s 10d. 
 
 
6. How Chant and Turton Are Used in Legal Commentaries On Evidence Published 
up to 1912 
 
The following review of how Chant and Turton are handled in the contemporary legal 
commentaries is arranged into five categories: 
 
 works that discuss the privileged status of solicitors’ bills of costs and with 
specific citation support from Chant and/or Turton only for that purpose – one 
case, actually a work by Ross published after his Halsbury co-contribution 
 works that use Chant and/or Turton to support some point other than the status 
of solicitors’ bills of costs but also use Chant and/or Turton in connection 
specifically with solicitors’ bills of costs – two cases (one being a work by 
Bray) 
 works that use Chant and/or Turton to support some point(s) other than the 
status of solicitors’ bills of costs – five cases 
 works that discuss the privileged status of solicitors’ bills of costs but without 
specific citation support from Chant and/or Turton – one case 
 works that do not mention Chant and/or Turton or the specific status of 
solicitors’ bills of costs – seven cases 
 
A. Works That Discuss the Privileged Status of Solicitors’ Bills of Costs and with 
Specific Citation Support from Chant and/or Turton Only for That Purpose 
 
                                                                                                                                            
others, Tildesley being involved because he and his partner owed the bank money due to them from the 
estate of a deceased. In Harper and Tildesley v Waterhouse [National Archives, C16/869/H128], filed 
on 26 May 1873, the plaintiffs were claiming that Harper’s debt to the defendant was discharged by the 
terms of an earlier will. This case actually arose as a cross-complaint from an earlier suit by 
Waterhouse against Harper and Tildesley in the Court of Exchequer. 
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(i) It is perhaps ironic that the only work citing both Chant and Turton in support 
of the privilege of lawyers’ bills of costs, and for no other purpose, is that of a co-
author of the original Halsbury contribution, Robert Ernest Ross. This appeared in his 
independent work on discovery,57 and all but verbatim with the earlier joint text in 
Halsbury, and so in later Halsburys. In fact, it is so reminiscent of the purportedly 
joint text that one suspects that Ross was solely responsible for that particular 
passage. 
 
B. Works That Use Chant and/or Turton to Support Some Point Other Than the 
Status of Solicitors’ Bills of Costs but Also Use Chant and/or Turton in Connection 
Specifically with Solicitors’ Bills of Costs 
 
(i) William Williamson Kerr’s 1870 book58 is a substantial work, one of the most 
important of those reviewed albeit containing only 312 pages, with as many as 11 
references to one or other Chant case, four references to Chant(I) alone, and three to 
Chant alone, and two to both cases simultaneously. Most of these references use the 
cases, sometimes with others, to assert particular points on the general principle of 
privilege – who has it, how far it extends, what happens to the privilege of a second 
party if the first party in jointly held privilege chooses to waive it, how long privilege 
endures, whether it can be inherited from a deceased person by somebody continuing 
a claim of the deceased, and so on. However, somewhat unusually, he does indeed 
discuss the privileged status of a bill of costs and points out a very narrow and 
specific derogation from the general rule, where fraud is involved. First, the general 
rule in such a case: 
 
The mere allegation of fraud is not sufficient to induce the court to break 
through the general rule [of privilege]. In order to take the case out of the 
ordinary rule as to privilege, there must be some specific charge in the bill 
connecting the discovery sought with the fraudulent act complained of. It is 
essential that the act complained of should on the face of the bill appear to be a 
fraud [at 126]. 
 
                                                 
57 RE Ross, The Law of Discovery Being a Comprehensive Treatise on the Principles and Practice 
Relating to Interrogatories, Discovery of Documents and Inspection of Documents in Proceedings in 
the High Court and County Court (Butterworth & Co., London 1912) 219. 
58 William Williamson Kerr, A Treatise on the Law of Discovery (William Maxwell & Son, London 
1870). 
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That is supported by reference to four case reports, two being the two Chant cases. 
However, later occurs the specific application of the general rule, in the absence of 
fraud, with respect to a bill of costs, which is that ‘. . . a party will not be ordered to 
produce his solicitor’s books, whether letter-books, journals, ledger, &c, or the bill of 
costs of his solicitor [emphasis added]’ (at 141). Two cited cases support the italicized 
point, the first being Chant. 
 
(ii) Given the role of Sir Edward Bray as the original co-author in Halsbury’s first 
edition of the material concerning the privileged status of an attorney’s bill of costs, it 
is especially interesting to note the somewhat tentative route that he took to reach, or 
co-reach, his final position on the matter. His major text on discovery59 does indeed 
refer to the Chant cases and to Turton. There are five references to Chant – as well as 
a further five to Chant(I). There are two references to Turton. 
 All his references to these cited cases, save as specified below, are to the sorts 
of other matters for which they were mentioned in the other authorities that have been 
cited. Only one passage (at 396) concerns both Chant and Turton with respect to the 
privileged status of a bill of costs, and its tone is decidedly tentative in comparison 
with the assertive tone of the Halsbury text. 
 
A bill of costs has been held [emphasis added] privileged in the hands of the 
client : Turton v. Barber, L. R. 17 Eq. 329 : and of the solicitor : Chant v. 
Brown, 9 Ha. 790 : for, p. 794, it was the solicitor’s history of the transaction 
in which he was concerned.  
 
C. Works That Use Chant and/or Turton to Support Some Point(s) Other Than the 
Status of Solicitors’ Bills of Costs 
 
(i) Sherlock Hare’s new edition of his father’s earlier work on discovery60 
mentions only Chant(I) and Turton, once each. The latter is mentioned merely 
                                                 
59 Edward Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (Reeves and Turner, London 1885). As His 
Honour Judge Bray, he also produced a short work in two editions (both under a hundred pages) on 
Digest of the Law of Discovery, with Practice Notes ( Sweet & Maxwell, London 1904, 1910); these 
were essentially addenda to his original text with later case material. Neither mentioned Chant or 
Turton, although Burton v Dodd and Ainsworth v Wilding both achieved predictable mentions. 
60 Thomas Hare, A Treatise on the Discovery of Evidence in the High Court of Justice: Being a Second 
Edition of a Treatise on the Discovery of Evidence by Bill and Answer in Equity, Adapted to the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts and Rules, 1873 & 1875, by Sherlock Hare (Butterworths, London 
1876). The 1st edition had appeared in 1835. 
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because (at 158) it follows the principle of the 1873 judgment of Minet v Morgan 
discussed above. Chant(I) is used only to state the widely quoted principle that 
privilege is not lost even if the solicitor concerned becomes an interested party (at 
165). 
 
(ii) John Pitt Taylor’s massive two-volume work61 was produced by its author in 
numerous editions during his lifetime and the seventh one of 1878 prepared by Taylor 
himself allows us to see how Chant and, by now, Turton might have been used. Both 
Chant and Chant(I) were cited as cases relevant to the matter of privilege but for three 
reasons, neither was concerned immediately with any principle specifically or 
explicitly about solicitors’ bills of costs, although it is reasonable that it be inferred 
that such bills might be included by implication among the extensive general lists of 
items said to be privileged. Respective sets of cases, including Chant in each, support 
two points: 
 
Where a barrister or solicitor is professionally employed by a client, all 
communications which pass between them in the course and for the purpose of 
that employment are so far privileged, that the legal adviser, when called as a 
witness, cannot be permitted to disclose them, whether they be in the form of 
title deeds, wills, documents, or other papers delivered, or statements made to 
him, or of letters, entries, or statements, written or made by him in that capacity 
[at 765-766]. 
 
and: 
 
Clerks cannot be permitted to disclose facts coming to their knowledge in the 
course of employment, unless a barrister or solicitor himself might have been 
interrogated respecting them [at 774]. 
 
Chant(I) supported the point that privilege is not lost or waived by the solicitor’s 
‘becoming personally interested in the property, to the title of which the 
communications related’ (at 779-780). Taylor cites Turton (at 778-779) because Sir 
Charles Hall’s judgment in that case specifically followed the precedent established a 
year earlier in Minet v Morgan.62 
                                                 
61 John Pitt Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence as Administered in England and Ireland With 
Illustrations From the American and Other Foreign Laws (7th edn William Maxwell & Son, London 
1878). The 1st edition was published in 1848. The omission of Wales from the title doubtless reflects 
English chauvinism and not any non-jurisdictionality in Wales. Intriguingly, the book retained this 
same title from 1848 through to its 12th, and final, edition in 1931, long after Taylor’s death in 1888. 
62Above (n 53). 
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Thus, there is no specific reference in this work by Taylor to the status of 
solicitors’ bills of costs. 
 
(iii) John Charles Day and Maurice Powell’s updating of the text of the famous 
legal writer Henry Roscoe63 did not cite either Chant case, but cited Turton for the 
same reason that Taylor does. 
 
(iv) Walter Sydney Sichel and William [later, Sir William] Chance’s book of 
188364 sounds from its title as though it will be comprehensive. However, it has no 
reference to either Chant case and only one to Turton, which is used in a footnote in 
the context only of a ‘compare also’. The point being made in the text concerned is: 
 
. . . immediate communications between solicitor and client or their respective 
agents in the cause to be now “with a view to litigation” need not have owed 
their existence to a direct contemplation thereof, but may be ante litem motam,65 
and if relating to matter which may [emphasis in original] become the subject of 
litigation, will be privileged, and may be described in the schedule or affidavit 
as referring to matters “now [emphasis in original] a question in the cause” [at 
64-65]. 
 
(v) Clarence John Peile’s book66 appeared in 1883 and included four references to 
Chant(I), two to Chant, and two to Turton. In discussing professional confidence and 
professional privilege, there are no passages concerned specifically with a solicitor’s 
bill of costs. Matters covered are mostly ones already encountered, though a couple 
are idiosyncratic. 
Thus, ‘privilege is not waived by the mere fact of the solicitor making an 
affidavit in the action in support of his client’s claim, if it do [sic – the charming and 
now obsolete subjunctive mood] not contain statements as to matters contended to be 
privileged’ (at 52) is supported by Turton; the duration of privilege is ‘not affected by 
                                                 
63 John C Day and Maurice Powell, Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence on the Trial of Actions at 
Nisi Prius (14th edn Stevens & Sons, London 1879). 
64 Walter S Sichel and William Chance, The Law Relating to Interrogatories, Production, Inspection of 
Documents and Discovery, As Well in the Superior As in the Inferior Courts, Together With an 
Appendix of the Acts, Forms, and Orders (Stevens and Sons, London 1883). 
65 Ie, before the suit is started or any controversy exists (the presumption being that the declarant then 
has no motive to distort the truth). 
66 Clarence John Peile, The Law and Practice of Discovery in the Supreme Court of Justice; With an 
Appendix of Forms, Orders, etc. (Stevens and Haynes, London 1883). Its Preface refers to ‘another 
[unspecified] work on the same subject’ that had recently appeared; one assumes that this may have 
been the work of Sichel and Chance (see above (n 64)). 
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the death of the client’ (also at 52) derives support from both Chant(I) and Chant; and 
privilege exists ‘where the client was the party from whom discovery is sought in 
anticipation [emphasis in original] of an apprehended litigation’ (at 53) primarily 
used Minet v Morgan, but noted that Turton had followed this. Further, ‘the privilege 
is not confined to the continuance of the action or other legal proceeding in which the 
communication may have been originally made [supported by several cases, including 
Chant(I)] . . . it applies, therefore, a fortiori, where the succeeding proceeding are 
[sic] substantially the same as the former, i.e. involve or embrace the same issues’ (at 
61). This point is supported by several cases, including a generic reference to Chant v 
Brown that in logic suggests that both cases are intended. Finally, ‘upon objections to 
an answer for insufficiency, the question is whether it was sufficient at the time it was 
filed’ (at 89) is supported by Chant(I). 
 
D. Works That Discuss the Privileged Status of Solicitors’ Bills of Costs but Without 
Specific Citation Support from Chant and/or Turton 
 
(i) The legal writer on evidence whose name has lived on eponymously for more 
than a century is Sidney Lovell Phipson (1851-1929), whose book on the subject was 
published first in 189267 and came out in five further editions from the hand of the 
original author, the sixth edition being in 1921. Successive editions do expand, often 
considerably so, on their respective preceding ones. His first edition does not include 
Turton at all (or for that matter Burton v Dodd). Only Chant(I) is actually mentioned, 
and for one of the reasons already given by Taylor – to show that privilege was 
retained even when the solicitor concerned ‘became personally interested’ in the 
matter (at 109).68 
Phipson does note that ‘a party cannot be compelled and a legal adviser will 
not be allowed to produce documents passing between them in professional 
confidence’ (at 100). He may have thought that solicitors’ bills of costs would be 
included in this generalization, but he is only specific on the matter later on. He 
prepares a table in two adjoining columns respectively listing material that is 
privileged and is not privileged. Among the former is ‘Solicitor’s bill of costs, 
                                                 
67 Sidney L Phipson, The Law of Evidence (Stevens and Haynes, London 1892). 
68 Further to complicate things, the citation of Chant v Brown in the Table of Cases is as ‘9 [sic] Hare 
79’, presumably a confusion of the two cases. However, he clearly intends only Chant(I), which is 
correctly cited where it occurs in the text. 
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whether in his own or the client’s possession’; however, instead of independently 
supporting this with Chant and Turton he merely gives, in parentheses, ‘Bray, 
Discovery, 396’, ie, the passage quoted above. 
In later editions he adopts the same practices with respect to issues and 
supporting citations and also the same tabular format for privileged and non-
privileged materials, but is more expansive on detail. In the third edition of 1902 and 
fourth of 1907, he says that privileged is ‘Solicitor’s bill of costs, in his own or his 
client’s possession: entries relating to actual or contemplated litigation (Ainsworth v. 
Wilding, supra), or other matters of confidential professional advice or assistance 
(Bray, Discovery, 396)’. Non-privileged is ‘Solicitor’s bill of costs: entries which are 
mere notes or reports of proceedings in Court or chambers in presence of opposite 
party (Ainsworth v. Wilding, opposite); or which show who paid the costs of, and 
were the real parties to, such proceedings (Irish Soc. v. Crommelin, supra69)’.70 
 
E. Works That Do Not Mention Chant and/or Turton or the Specific Status of 
Solicitors’ Bills of Costs 
 
(i) The edition of the famous work on evidence71 published immediately after 
Chant and after the death of the original author, Thomas Starkie, has no mention of 
either Chant case, although it contains a relatively brief discussion on the extent of 
privilege concerning confidential information to and from barristers, attorneys, etc. 
 
(ii) Charles Edward Pollock, in his contribution to the work published together 
with that of Henry Thurstan Holland and Thomas Chandless,72 did not cite Chant at 
                                                 
69 [1892] 2 IrLTJo [Irish Law Times and Solicitors’ Journal] 265. 
70 At 174 in 3rd ed. This format was left unchanged by Phipson in the 5th edition of his book in 1910 
and even the 6th of 1921, though in referring to Chant(I) he reverses the citation confusion of his 1st 
edition and is now citing it as ‘7 Hare 790 [sic]’. The 7th edition, prepared by Roland Burrows and 
Charles Montague Cahn after Phipson’s death in 1929, which one might have thought an opportunity 
for a more radical revision, is exactly as in the immediately previous editions from Phipson himself. 
Perhaps the new editors felt obliged to respect his posthumous reputation. Indeed, they continue the 
confusion in his reference to Chant(I) at 199 but in the Table of Cases cite Chant but not Chant(I). 
71 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence, and Digest of Proofs, in Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings, 4th edn by George Morley Dowdeswell and John George Malcolm (4th edn V. & 
R. Stevens and G. S. Norton, London 1853) 40. 
72 Henry Thurstan Holland and Thomas Chandless, Jun., The Common Law Procedure Act, 
MDCCCLIV, with Treatises on Injunction and Relief; Also a Treatise on Inspection and Discovery, by 
Charles Edward Pollock, Together with Notes, Cases, Index and the New Rules and Forms of 
Michaelmas Vacation (S. Sweet, London 1854) 47. Pollock’s portion of the total publication is 
described as a new edition of a former work by him on the same subject. 
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all but used only Chant(I), then recently decided, to support the principle that 
privilege was not lost because the counsel or attorney afterwards became interested in 
the property to the title of which the communication related. Pollock’s work is of 
incidental interest in drawing a specific early distinction between the privilege of the 
solicitor and that of the client, in view of the point made by several current-day 
writers that ‘legal professional privilege’ is the wrong label since the privilege 
belongs to the client. 
 
(iii) Although on a relevant topic and offering the possibility of a discussion of 
Chant and of lawyers’ feenotes, William Comer Petheram’s work73 is a relatively 
short book of 116 pages on the limited topic implied by the title. It contains no 
reference to Chant or to bills of costs. 
 
(iv) The tenth edition of Samuel March Phillipps’ book on the law of evidence was 
apparently published in 1852, to infer from the byline date of his ‘Notice to the 
Reader’. As in the preceding ninth edition of 1843, there was no reference to 
Chant(I), which had of course been decided in the interim. However, the copy of this 
tenth edition held by the British Library is in fact the fifth American edition in three 
volumes that appeared in 1868.74 Among the additional American Notes is a reference 
to Chant v Browne,75 cited as ‘12 Eng. Law & Eq. 299’. This is in the American 
publication, English Reports in Law and Equity, and, from its context, seems to be a 
reference to the further component of Chant not concerned with a bill of costs, though 
that has not been proved possible to check because the copy once held in the British 
Library was destroyed in the Second World War. 
The principal point made by the American author is that ‘the protection 
afforded to professional confidence applies not only to the professional advisers of the 
parties to a suit, but also to the professional advisers of strangers to a suit’. A footnote 
                                                 
73 William Comer Petheram, The Law and Practice Relating to Discovery by Interrogatories under the 
Common Law Procedure Act, 1854; Together with an Appendix of Precedents, and Full Index 
(William Maxwell, London 1864). 
74 S March Phillips and Thomas James Arnold, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Tenth English 
Edition, With Considerable Alteration and Additions, Being Fifth American Edition With Cowen and 
Hill’s Notes, With Additional Notes and References to the English and American Cases to the Present 
Time, by Isaac Edwards, Counselor at Law, 3 vols, (Banks & Brothers, New York 1868). 
75 This is the correct spelling of the defendants’ surname according the original Chancery documents, 
suggesting that this case was being independently reported and was not merely copied from the English 
reports. 
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cites a case supporting this, to which is made – inside the same footnote – an addition, 
viz. ‘A person holding a document prepared by him as solicitor for a person under 
whom both plaintiffs and defendants claim, and for a third party, a mortgagee, is held 
not bound to produce it; it is otherwise where no third person is interested in the 
preparation of the document’, then Chant v Browne as cited.76 
 
(v) James Fitzjames Stephen’s modest book (only 198 pages), albeit with a 
promising title,77 is silent on both Chant and Turton, and on bills of costs, although it 
is fair to concede that it was not written to be a reference work to provide a 
comprehensive coverage of the law of evidence but rather as a manifesto to seek a 
legislative consolidation of the principles of evidence.78 
 
(vi) Henry Wyatt Hart and Ernest Eiloart’s short work,79 little more than a 
pamphlet, includes a number of interesting observations and case-law examples on 
privilege, some of which seem not to be in other contemporary authors on the subject, 
but none is on solicitors’ bills of costs per se and, in the course of their discussions, 
they cite neither Chant or Turton. They perhaps depart slightly in spirit from the 
edifice of privilege seen in, for example, John Pitt Taylor, with such principles such 
as ‘when a brief is produced, the privileged part may be sealed up’, ‘privilege cannot 
be claimed for private and confidential letters from a stranger to a suit on the ground 
that the writer forbids their production’, ‘letters from a stranger to a suit to a 
plaintiff’s solicitor, though expressed to be written in confidence, are not privileged 
unless written with a view to litigation’, and ‘privilege does not extend to 
communications made to a solicitor, but not in his professional capacity’, are 
supported by various case references, but not relevant to Chant or Turton. 
 
(vii) William Blake Odgers’ updating of Edmund [to be distinguished from 
‘Maurice’] Powell’s The Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence80 contained 
                                                 
76 Above (n 74) 1, 154, 124. 
77 James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (1st edn Macmillan & Co., London 
1876). 
78 See KJM. Smith, ‘Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, first baronet (1829-1894), judge and writer’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, at www.oxforddnb.com. 
79 H Wyatt Hart and Ernest Eiloart, Interrogatories, Rules relating to the Law of Discovery and 
Inspection: Now Administered in the High Court of Justice (William Maxwell, London 1879). 
80 W Blake Odgers, Powell’s Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence (re-written and re-
arranged by W Blake Odgers) (9th edn Butterworth & Co, London 1910). Powell’s original work was 
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no mention of Turton (nor of Burton v Dodd), but used only Chant(I) to make the oft-
repeated point about a solicitor’s privilege extending to a case where he had a 
personal interest. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has had two related, but distinct, purposes: 
 
• to dispute any current absolute claim for legal professional privilege for 
solicitors’ bills of costs 
• to expose the fragility of the unquestioning reliance, both in the past and 
certainly in the current legal era, on Chant and Turton as authorities for the 
blanket privilege protection given to such bills 
 
It is academically interesting how views with respect to the coverage of solicitors’ 
bills of costs did evolve. Given how the principle of privilege developed throughout 
the nineteenth century, it would be unfair on the legal authors of that time for us now 
to infer that the standard principle of privilege in the later nineteenth century would 
not have been reasonably assumed by them to cover lawyers’ bill, even if many of 
them did not mention this in their works. The nineteenth-century view embodied by 
later editions of John Pitt Taylor’s work, for example, on what was actually covered 
by legal professional privilege was comprehensive and inclusive – any 
communication between a solicitor and client was, by the later nineteenth-century 
yardstick of him and others, covered by privilege. This view was been established by 
a number of cases earlier in the century81 and, for Taylor, would necessarily have 
included bills of costs, even if (despite the copiousness of his work) he does not single 
out such bills out for any special mention (even in its post-Minet v Morgan edition). 
                                                                                                                                            
published as The New Practice of Evidence in 1855 (the British Library’s copy of this edition is marked 
as having been destroyed); subsequent editions were all titled The Principles and Practice of the Law 
of Evidence. The 2nd edition (John Crockford, London 1859), the last prepared by Powell himself, 
mentions neither Chant case, nor bills of costs. The same is true of the 3rd edition (Butterworths, 
London 1869), this edition prepared by John Cutler and Edmund Fuller Griffin. 
81 Two were especially important and much cited by later authors: Greenough and Others v Gaskell 
[1833] 1 My. & K. 98; (1824-34) All ER Rep 767, and Carpmael v Powis [1846] 1 Ph. 687. 
 34 
 That, however, is a different matter from holding up the entire edifice of 
privilege for lawyers’ bills for almost one hundred years exclusively, or effectively so, 
specifically on Chant and Turton. Given what we have sought to show about the 
extreme shakiness of the pedigree of these cases for the foundational purpose being 
attributed to them in Halsbury, it seems hardly defensible from the point of view of a 
convincing legal methodology that lawyers wanting to claim legal professional 
privilege for solicitors’ bills of costs merely cite Chant and Turton in their original 
nineteenth-century citation styles, as some present-day ones still do, and assume ‘case 
proven’. Of course, the laziest practitioners in all academic disciplines cite references 
at second hand without referring back to check their originals. Lawyers are not 
uniquely guilty of that academic peccadillo. However, given that the law is a client-
based profession more than many others, such sloppiness may have more personal 
consequences. 
Besides Bray and Ross, there seems only one author of a work on evidence 
published up to 1912 in all those examined who gave an independent support to this 
view. This is William Williamson Kerr. Indeed, it seems that his work was the first to 
pick up the purported precedent set by Chant, which was taken up by Bray (who 
added Turton), copied by Phipson (simply following Bray), till the statement in the 
first-edition Halsbury, and then by Ross alone. In any branch of law there are going to 
be iconic cases, ones that no work on its subject seeking any degree of academic 
respectability can afford not to mention or discuss. Such cases have been encountered 
in the present exercise: Greenough, Carpmael and Minet, for example, would surely 
all qualify as such. It is clear that Chant would not, and never would have done, and 
even less so would Turton. 
It perhaps seems churlish to be sniffy about the degree of posthumous 
achievement recognized in standard published biographical sources. How people 
appear as entries in the Dictionary of National Biography is presumably through 
obvious qualification by dint of fame or achievement or by nomination as worthy 
candidates. The matter with entries in Who’s Who (and so with the deceased in Who 
Was Who) is perhaps slightly different since some worthy inclusions may not be there 
because they have neither sought nor wanted their inclusion. Even so, despite these 
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provisos, in assessing renown it remains true that neither Bray82 nor Ross has their 
own entry in the Oxford DNB and Bray alone is in Who Was Who. It is reasonable to 
agree that both may be considered contributors of some significance to late-nineteenth 
and early- to mid-twentieth centuries jurisprudence. However, neither ranks among 
the great iconic jurists of this period. Thus, it seems that the entire edifice of how 
Chant and Turton have been specifically cited for a hundred years as authorities to be 
accorded to claim the privileged status of solicitors’ bills of costs is based on the pre-
eminence given to the views of two – in historical terms – relatively obscure legal 
writers above those of others with greater claims to posthumous recognition. Perhaps 
on that ground alone, it may be time to re-consider the sacrosanct status of these 
cases. 
 However, this saga raises a deeper and perhaps more troubling question about 
legal methodology, with its disproportionate reliance on the tyranny of precedent that 
is often as in this case at the expense of logic and common sense. There is no reason 
why the amount that a solicitor charges should be routinely protected by privilege. 
Only in the most exceptional situation would such information confer a litigation 
advantage. Yet it is only in recent years that the common-sense principle of redaction 
to exclude sensitive content has become more widely accepted. 
                                                 
82 It is true that Bray does earn a mention in the entry for his elder brother, Sir Reginald More Bray, 
who was a rather controversial judge; see PA Landon, ‘Bray, Sir Reginald More (1842-1923)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography at www.oxforddnb.com. 
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APPENDIX: BRIEF RELEVANT BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE 
BRITISH AUTHORS OF THE WORKS CITED 
 
Lack of a reference to the Oxford DNB and/or to Who Was Who/Who’s Who means 
that details of the individual concerned were alternatively ascertained from birth and 
death records, probate records, relevant Law Lists and Census records until 1901.  
 
ARNOLD, Thomas James (1803/04–77) was from 1829 a Magistrate in the 
Westminster Police Court. 
BRAY, Sir Edward, BA (Cambridge, 1873) (1849–1926); see text of article and Who 
Was Who, II. 
BROWNING, William Ernst (1830–1916) was a barrister who had worked in the 
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. He qualified on 26 January 1853. He 
had been one of His [sic] Majesty’s Judges in Jamaica, thus at some time 
between 1901 and 1907. 
BURROWS, Sir Roland, MA, LLM (Cambridge), LLD (London), QC (1882–1952) 
was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple and from 1928 Recorder of 
Cambridge. See Who Was Who, V. 
CAHN, Charles Montague, BA (Oxford, 1923) (1900–85) was a Barrister-at-Law in 
the Inner Temple and on the Oxford Circuit and Assistant Judge Advocate-
General from 1946. See Who Was Who, VIII.  
CHANCE, Sir William, 2nd Baronet, BA (Cambridge, 1876), MA (Cambridge, 1879) 
(1853–1935) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. See Who Was Who, 
III. 
CHANDLESS, Thomas, Jr., BA (Oxford, 1848), MA (Oxford, 1852) (1826–91) was a 
Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. 
CUTLER, John, BA (Oxford, 1863), KC (1839–1924) was a Barrister-at-Law in 
Lincoln’s Inn. He was also long-serving as Professor of English Law and 
Jurisprudence and Professor of Indian Jurisprudence at King’s College, London. 
See Who Was Who, II. 
DAY, Sir John Charles Frederic Sigismund (1826–1908), later a judge in the Queen’s 
Bench Division with a less than illustrious reputation because of inattentiveness 
and then a criminal judge of fearsome inclination towards intolerance and 
repressive punishment. See Who Was Who, I and Oxford DNB. 
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De HART, Edward Louis, BA (Cambridge, 1881), MA (Cambridge, 1883) (1858–
1927) was a Barrister-at-Law. Born in Newcastle upon Tyne, his parents had 
originated in The Netherlands; his father, Joachim de Hart, was a ship broker. 
DOWDESWELL, George Morley, BA (Oxford, 1830), MA (Oxford, 1833) (1809–
93) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. 
EILOART, Ernest (1853–91) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. Like his co-
author five years earlier, he died far from home, in his case in Sierra Leone. 
ELLISON, John Harold (1916-2000) was a Barrister-at-Law in Lincoln’s Inn. See 
Who Was Who, X. 
EVERSHED, Francis Raymond, 1st Baron, of Stapenhill (1899–1966) was Master of 
the Rolls from 1949 to 1962; see Who Was Who, VI and Oxford DNB. 
GEDGE, Cecil Bertram, BA (Cambridge, 1888) (1866–1915) was a Barrister-at-Law. 
He was born in Mitcham, [then] Surrey. He volunteered into the London 
Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) in the First World War and as a Second Lieutenant 
was killed in action on 25 September 1915. 
GOODMAN, Sir Victor Martin Reeves (1899–1967) was Clerk Assistant in the 
House of Lords; see Who Was Who, VI. 
GRIFFIN, Edmund Fuller, BA (Oxford, 1861) (1839–90) was a Barrister-at-Law in 
Lincoln’s Inn and on the Home Circuit and lectured in English law at King’s 
College, London. 
HARE, Thomas (1806–91) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. See Oxford 
DNB. 
HARE, Sherlock (1840–1912) was a son of Thomas Hare above and also a Barrister-
at-Law in the Inner Temple. 
HART, Henry Wyatt, BA (Cambridge, 1873) (1851–86) was a Barrister-at-Law in the 
Inner Temple. He died in Aden on a journey back from Australia. 
HOLLAND, Henry Thurstan, BA (Cambridge, 1847) (1825–1914) was a Barrister-at-
Law in the Inner Temple. See Oxford DNB. 
HOLLANDER, Charles Simon (born 1955); see Who’s Who. 
JACOBS, Bertram, LLB (London, 1899) (1871–1957) was awarded a First Class 
degree by private study and became was a Barrister-at-Law of the Inner Temple 
and on the South Wales Circuit, although his death certificate describes him as a 
solicitor.  
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JELF, Sir Ernest Arthur (1868–1949) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple and 
became Senior Master of the Supreme Court and King’s Chief Remembrancer. 
See Who Was Who, IV. 
KERR, William Williamson, BA (Oxford, 1843), MA (Oxford, 1845) (1820–1902) 
was a Barrister-at-Law in Lincoln’s Inn. 
KIMBER, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Gibbs (1870–1954); see Who Was Who, V. 
LESLIE, Harman John, MA (born 1946); see Who’s Who. 
MALCOLM, John George (1800/01–72) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple 
and on the Home Circuit and later Master of the Crown Office. 
MARCHANT, James Robert Vernam, BA (Oxford, 1876), MA (Oxford, 1879) 
(1853–1936) was a Barrister-at-Law on the Oxford Circuit and later a County 
Court Judge. He had co-edited Cassell’s Latin Dictionary (Latin-English and 
English-Latin) (London, Paris & Melbourne: Cassell and Company, 1892). See 
Who Was Who, III. 
ODGERS, William Blake, BA (Cambridge, 1871), MA, LLM (Cambridge, 1874), 
LLD (Cambridge, 1880), LLD, KC (1849–1924) was the holder of many legal 
offices, including later the Recorder of Bristol. He was a well-known legal 
writer: eg, Principles of Pleading and Practice in Civil Actions in the High 
Court of Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1st ed, 1891) and A Digest of the Law 
of Libel and Slander; With the Evidence, Procedure, and Practice, Both in Civil 
and Criminal Cases, and Precedents of Pleadings (London: Stevens and Sons, 
1st ed, 1881). See Who Was Who, II. 
PEASE, Joseph Gerald, BA (London, 1881) (1863–1928); see Who Was Who, II.  
PEILE, Clarence John, BA (Cambridge, 1870) (1847–1900) became a Barrister-at-
Law in the Inner Temple. In 1871 he had been a schoolmaster at Clifton College 
in Bristol. 
PETHERAM, Sir William Comer (1835–1922) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Middle 
Temple. See Who Was Who, II. 
PHILLIPPS, Samuel March, BA (Cambridge, 1802), MA (Cambridge, 1805) (1780–
1862) was a legal writer and civil servant. He qualified in 1806 as a Barrister-at-
Law in the Inner Temple, but did not practise. See Oxford DNB. 
PHIPSON, Sidney Lovell, BA (Cambridge, 1877), MA (Cambridge, 1893) (1851–
1929) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. He had attended Clare 
College, Cambridge and first produced his The Law of Evidence in 1892. He 
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produced up to the sixth edition in his own lifetime; the 2nd in 1898, the 3rd in 
1902, the 4th in 1907, the 5th in 1910, and the 6th in 1921. The 7th, in 1930 after 
Phipson’s death, was produced by Roland [later, Sir Roland] Burrows (who 
worked up to the 9th edition in 1952), assisted by Charles Montague Cahn. As 
we know, Phipson reached its 16th edition in 2005. 
POLLOCK, Hon Sir Charles Edward (1823–97) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner 
Temple; see Who Was Who, I and Oxford DNB. 
PORTER, Sir William Haldane (1867–1944) was an His Majesty’s Inspector under 
the Aliens Act, 1905. See Who Was Who, IV. 
POWELL, Edmund, BA (Oxford, 1849), MA (Oxford, 1852) (1826–64) attended 
Magdalen and Lincoln Colleges Oxford and became a Barrister-at-Law in the 
Inner Temple. He died at the early age of thirty-eight. 
POWELL, Maurice, BA (Cambridge, 1862), MA (Cambridge, 1865) (1838–1914) 
was a Barrister-at-Law. He attended Trinity College, Cambridge. 
RENTON, Sir Alexander Wood, MA, LLB (Edinburgh) (1861–1933) was once a 
Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. See Who Was Who, III. 
ROBERTSON, Maxwell Alexander (1874–1916), was a Barrister-at-Law of the Inner 
Temple and on the Midland Circuit. He was called to the bar in 1899. He died 
on 1 July 1916 in France of wounds received. 
ROCHE, Sir Alexander Adair [later, Baron Roche of Chadlington] (1871–1956); see 
Who Was Who, V and Oxford DNB. 
ROSCOE, Henry (1800–36) was legal writer and biographer, whose first edition of 
his work on evidence had appeared in 1827. See Oxford DNB. 
ROSS, Robert Ernest, LLB (London, 1898) (1871–1960); see text of article. 
SICHEL, Walter Sydney, BA (Oxford, 1877), MA (Oxford, 1880) (1855–1933) was a 
Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple and an author on numerous topics. See 
Who Was Who, III. 
STARKIE, Thomas, BA (Cambridge, 1803), MA (Cambridge, 1806) (1782–1849) 
was jurist and legal writer on several important legal topics. He was a Barrister-
at-Law in Lincoln’s Inn and on the Northern Circuit. See Oxford DNB. 
STEPHEN, Sir James Fitzjames, BA (Cambridge, 1852), MA (Cambridge, 1857), 
LLB (London, 1854), DCL (Oxford, 1878), QC (1829–94) was initially a 
Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple, then a judge and legal writer. See Oxford 
DNB. 
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TAYLOR, John Pitt, BA (Oxford, 1834) (1811–88) spent most of his career as a 
County Court Judge. When the first edition of his work on evidence was 
published, he was a Barrister-at-Law in the Middle Temple. In 1852 he became 
presiding judge over the Lambeth, the Greenwich and the Woolwich County 
Courts, positions held for a further thirty-three years. In October 1885, already 
nearly seventy-four, he tendered his resignation to the Lord Chancellor, citing 
his advancing years and ill health. 
TURNER, Maxwell Joseph Hall (1907–60) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner 
Temple and on the South Eastern Circuit and became a Judge of the Mayor’s 
and City of London Court. See Who Was Who, V. 
WATERS, John Dallas (1889–1967) was a Barrister-at-Law in the Inner Temple. See 
Who Was Who, VI. 
WHEATCROFT, George Shorrock Ashcombe, MA (1907–87) was a Master of the 
Supreme Court (Chancery Division). See Who Was Who, VIII and Oxford DNB. 
WIGRAM, Sir James, BA (Cambridge, 1815), MA (Cambridge, 1818) (1793–1866) 
was ‘one of His Majesty’s Counsel’, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and a Vice-
Chancellor from 1841 to 1850. See Oxford DNB. 
 
 
 
